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Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to discuss the role of open-book accounting (OBA) and trust on buyer–supplier
relationship satisfaction. The objective of this paper is to analyze howOBA and trust inﬂuence satisfaction on
the relationship between suppliers and buyers in the Brazilian automotive sector’s supply chain.
Design/methodology/approach – The research has been developed based on a qualitative strategy,
characterized as explanatory. Data gathering has been conducted through document analysis and semi-
structured interview, and content analysis has been used for discourse analysis.
Findings – Results show that OBA is unilateral, imposed by the auto manufacturer, representing a selective
information process, as suppliers try to protect their information value as far as possible. Trust is partial and
cooperation is not spontaneous, both driven by the search for beneﬁts. OBAmay yield a positive or a negative
outcome with regard to the social and the economic overall satisfaction of suppliers, depending on how the
information is used by automanufacturer.
Originality/value – The main contribution of this article is to provide an understanding of the difﬁculties
of applying the OBA in companies and of the factors that may inﬂuence its operation and performance,
impacting on satisfaction and continuity of relationships. The paper also contributes with the proposal of a
clearer and more objective deﬁnition of OBA. Being the intention that new research in this area can be
developed from a delimited, clear and objective deﬁnition of OBA, allowing better understanding on the
subject and comparison among research studies.
Keywords Trust, Costs strategic management, Inter-organizational cost management
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
Companies have shown increasing interest in business networking. According to Kulmala
et al. (2002), it occurs as a result of globalization and the fact that companies must manage
their costs to sustain decreasing prices indexes. Many companies have developed strict and
cooperative relationships with suppliers and buyers (Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004; Kajüter
and Kulmala, 2005). According to Windolph and Moeller (2012), companies are increasingly
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passing on to external suppliers activities that are not connected with their essential
competencies to gain and keep competitive advantage, decrease costs and speed up product
development.
Cost management practices end up beyond the company’s borders (Cooper and
Slagmulder, 1999, 2004; Kulmala et al., 2002; Dekker, 2003; Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005).
Literature shows that the relationship between companies inﬂuence the adoption of
management cost techniques that go beyond the company’s boundary (Cooper and
Slagmulder, 2004).
Cost information is conﬁdential (Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005), which explains why it is
difﬁcult for companies to share it. open-book accounting (OBA) is one of the tools used for
interorganizational cost management (IOCM) to manage costs efﬁciently to decrease costs,
generate beneﬁts for the partners (Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005), control collaborative events
(Tomkins, 2001; Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005) and enhance relationship between the parties in
supply chains (Romano and Formetini, 2012). Therefore, according to Di and Wang (2017),
OBA positively impacts IOCM. According to Morgan and Hunt (1994), Kulmala (2004) and
Agndal and Nilsson (2008), costs information sharing may increase trust, commitment and
cooperation levels (Mahama, 2006) between buyer and supplier.
To achieve efﬁcient information sharing, the parties must be satisﬁed with their
relationship and trust that such information is not being used opportunistically. Otherwise,
it may cause dissatisfaction, as in a unilateral behavior, (Windolph and Moeller, 2012),
because of information asymmetry issues that increase transactional costs (Williamson,
1975, 1985). On one hand, according to transaction costs economics (TCE), OBA increases
efﬁciency of the transaction by reducing costs; on the other hand, it allows opportunist
behavior if unilaterally applied, increasing transaction risk and costs as it increases
monitoring costs (Windolph and Moeller, 2012). Information sharing between companies
may have a positive or a negative impact on their relationship.
Satisfaction key factors aim at delivering satisfaction so that the relationship is enduring.
Voldnes et al. (2012) say that the study of necessary factors to achieve satisfaction in a
buyer–supplier relationship has been a central subject in literature. Among those factors,
mutual trust and information sharing through OBA will be emphasized as previous
research studies show that these are key components for a successful relationship between
buyers and suppliers (Carr and Ng, 1995; Ellram, 1996; Seal et al., 1999; Kulmala, 2002;
Axelsson et al., 2002; Tomkins, 2001; Dekker, 2003; Langﬁeld-Smith and Smith, 2003;
Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005; Rodríguez Agudo and Gutiérrez, 2006; Nyaga et al., 2010;
Abinajm Filho, 2011; Hoffjan et al., 2011; Voldnes et al., 2012).
The automotive sector supply chain has been studied for the present research, as it is
pioneer in several managerial concepts, techniques and technological innovation, which are
used by companies from different sectors, highlighting its importance to the development of
companies in general. The automotive sector is one of the most relevant for the industry
sectors as it is considered an important employment and income source (Pires, 1998; Marini,
2003; Guarnieri et al., 2009; Pires and Sacomano Neto, 2010; Abinajm Filho, 2011).
In the face of the issues presented and considering the lack of empirical studies
approaching OBA and trust inﬂuence over interorganizational relationship satisfaction
through a dyadic perspective, the general objective is to investigate how OBA and trust
inﬂuence relationship satisfaction between suppliers and buyers on the automotive sector
supply chain, from the perspective of TCE.
OBA and trust critical aspects, which may consequently impact relationship satisfaction,
such as the risk of opportunism, speciﬁcity of assets invested and need to establish
safeguards are considered in TCE. Thus, this studymay contribute to reinforce such theory.
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The present study is justiﬁed by the lack of studies analyzing OBA on a dyadic
perspective. This research aims to broaden knowledge regarding literature about OBA in
interorganizational relationships and how it is inﬂuenced by the relational context.
Therefore, the ﬁndings should contribute to understand difﬁculties to apply this instrument
on companies and factors that may inﬂuence its operation and performance, impacting on
satisfaction and continuity of relationships. It is also intended to contribute to companies’
managers from the automotive sector as the successful application of OBA may aid in
competitive advantage creation, as this sector is under a lot of pressure for costs reduction.
As there is a lack of agreement about OBA deﬁnition on the literature, it is also expected
to contribute with the proposal of a clearer and more objective deﬁnition of it. Being the
intention that further research studies on this ﬁeld may be developed based on a delimited
deﬁnition of OBA, allowing better understanding on the subject and comparison among
research studies.
The work is structured in four sections, plus introduction. The ﬁrst section approaches
literature review; the second section presents the methodological aspects; the third section
presents the analysis, results interpretation and discussion; and the last section presents the
ﬁnal considerations.
Literature review
Buyer–supplier relationship
Transactional relations are discrete relations (Morgan and Hunt, 1994) characterized by
limited communication and restricted content. The parties’ identity is usually ignored or
relations have no continuity (Dwyer et al., 1987), personal relations are minimum, with no
joint efforts and short lasting (Macneil, 1978). This kind of relationship is a simple
commercial relation with no intention of becoming a strict and long-lasting connection as it
happens in common and auxiliary relationships (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1999, 2004) in
which the application of a IOCM, as well as OBA, is damaged.
Agndal and Nilsson (2010) observe that relationships based on transactional buying
strategies present low speciﬁcity investment, low commitment degree, focus on self-beneﬁts,
lack of dependence by buyer, a lot of alternatives for suppliers, limited importance input for
buyer, buyer’s opportunistic behavior, etc. OBA is applied to supplier’s assessment,
characterized by a controversial environment; and incentives are based on short-term
earnings. The objective of information sharing is to facilitate suppliers monitoring instead of
supporting planning and coordination of joint activities (Tomkins, 2001; Agndal and
Nilsson, 2010).
By contrast, cooperation-oriented relations refer to interrelated exchanges revealed over
time. In this context, each transaction must be analyzed considering its history, and future
collaboration is based on trust and planning. By means of repeated transactions, parties
have shown trust and stated amicable and reciprocal rules in the relationships (Macneil,
1978). Choi and Wu (2009) state that companies have long-term commitment, have the same
objectives, interact frequently, share information and present higher level of trust and
commitment in this kind of relationship.
Relationships based on interrelates purchases strategies are, according to Agndal and
Nilsson (2010), characterized by signiﬁcative speciﬁc investment, high level of commitment,
focus on mutual beneﬁts, critical product for buyer, few alternative of suppliers,
interdependence, mutual trust, etc. OBA is used to reduce costs by developing the product
together; the environment is less controversial and supplier gains long-term beneﬁts.
Cooperation-oriented relationships present a favorable environment to apply cost
information management and sharing between companies. According to Cooper and
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Slagmulder (1999, 2004), the above-mentioned features are found in relationships classiﬁed
as main and familiar.
Brito andMariotto (2013, p. 244, translated) propose that:
Cooperation refer to situations in which separated parties work together to reach mutual or
individual objectives in a reciprocal way over time that would not be economically achieved if
they acted in isolation.
One party commits with the other when it realizes that it will enjoy long-term advantages
from knowledge, experience, ability and resources presented by the other party (Jonsson and
Zineldin, 2003; Brito and Mariotto, 2013); it is expected to gain beneﬁts to engage in
cooperation.
Balestrin and Verschoore (2014) highlight selﬁsh cooperation, that is, practiced by selﬁsh
individuals (not altruistic) in which there is collective action although certain conditions
must be met such as the will of achieving a certain beneﬁt that would not be achieved if the
party acted by itself. Therefore, cooperation among not altruistic individuals occurs from a
common interest between the parties of a relationship when they realize that the common
interest can only be achieved if they work together. Thus, selﬁsh cooperation emerges from
intentional actions between independent players to reach individual and collective
objectives simultaneously.
Buyer–supplier relationship in the automotive sector
In this sector, new relationship standards between auto manufacturers and suppliers have
led the auto parties supply structures into a ranking process (Di Serio et al., 2007; Vanalle
and Salles, 2011) by reducing the number of auto manufacturers’ suppliers (Soares, 2011),
which started to provide subsets in modules or systems. Consequently, these suppliers have
settled near the auto manufacturers, thereof the importance of their location (Vanalle and
Salles, 2011; Martins et al., 2012a). According to Soares (2011), auto manufacturers have
started to focus on activities that provide higher value-added and competitive advantage by
restructuring and strengthening their supplier base and selecting the ones to build a strict
relationship.
The automotive sector is one of the most important for the industry sectors, as it is an
important employment and income source; moreover, the sector is also pioneer of several
managerial concepts/techniques and technological innovation (Pires, 1998; Marini, 2003;
Guarnieri et al., 2009; Guarnieri and Hatakeyama, 2010; Pires and Sacomano Neto, 2010;
Abinajm Filho, 2011). The automotive industry is considered a basic source of orientation
for practices that prioritize relations (Martins et al., 2012b).
Guarnieri et al. (2009) state that the automotive sector is constantly pressured for cost
reduction, improvement on quality and assistance processes, reduction on products’ life
cycle, meeting newmarkets andmanaging its supply chain.
Changes in the automotive industry have led suppliers to ﬁt their production processes to
the auto manufacturers’ demands and, as a consequence, have determined better activities
coordination, better integration and interaction among the supply chain’s members
(Scavarda and Hamacher, 2001; Vanalle and Salles, 2011).
Open-book accounting
Windolph and Moeller (2012) afﬁrm that OBA means a subset of information exchange;
whereas Noordewier et al. (1990) state that, at some point, every transaction involves
information sharing between suppliers and buyers.
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Although these aspects are true, they are not enough to characterize OBA objectively.
Sharing information not only distributes supply and demand of information among the
members of the supply chain but it also includes cost information sharing, which is usually
kept in secret by any company (Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005).
Kulmala (2003) highlights that, by practicing OBA, a company reveals its cost structure
to another, thus showing commitment with the future of their relationship, strengthening its
position as supplier or buyer among competitors, learning about the other company’s
operations and conducting efforts for costs reduction. Souza (2008, p. 39, translated) deﬁnes
OBA as “a managerial instrument of private information sharing, relevant in the
interorganizational management process”.
Caglio and Ditillo (2012) consider OBA as all conﬁdential information from Managerial
Accounting exchanged between collaborative companies. However, according to Seal et al.
(1999), as well as Carr and Ng (1995), OBA is not always applied based on trust and
partnership – it can often be forced – as it generally occurs in the automotive industry.
Sadeghi and Jokar (2014) state that OBA is an accounting technique in which a company
discloses details related to costs data for especial partners, however the authors do not
specify “especial partners”.
According to the authors of the present work, OBA is a kind of information sharing
between companies and they deﬁne it as a process of information sharing, initially
conﬁdential, related to costs, processes and activities, between parties in a relationship, aiming
at costs management.
Kajüter and Kulmala (2005) and Kulmala et al. (2002) consider that the main purpose of
OBA is to enhance the efﬁciency of interorganizational costs management by revealing the
potential for costs reduction by means of joint actions between buyers and suppliers.
According to Agndal and Nilsson (2008), the main purpose of OBA is to allow collaboration
between buyer and supplier, in a way that they work together to eliminate waste and add
value for both. Likewise, Di and Wang (2017) agree that OBA positively impacts
interorganizational costs management.
Alenius et al. (2015) ensure that OBA plays a key role in the establishment and
management of closer relationships between buyers and suppliers. DhaifAllah et al. (2016)
conﬁrm it when they verify that OBA, as well as IOCM, enhance interorganizational
relationships mainly when the parties establish interrelated safeguards to repress
opportunistic behavior.
According to Dekker (2003), sharing costs information may be harmful to the supplier, as
the buyer may use the information for his own beneﬁt in a price negotiation. Thus, the
supplier becomes more vulnerable to the buyer’s opportunistic behavior (Munday, 1992;
McIvor, 2001; Dekker, 2003). Romano and Formetini (2012) highlight that, in such situation,
the supplier may see OBA as the buyer’s attempt to reduce prices.
Power asymmetry may negatively inﬂuence the chance of using OBA, as the party with
less power may be afraid of exploitation, whereas the party with more power may not
perceive a reason for collaborating with the less powerful party (Piontkowski and Hoffjan,
2009).
Ellstrom and Larsson (2017) state that when buyer allows the supplier to increase prices
because of changes in its costs, there is a more efﬁcient application of OBA by the
consequent increase in cooperation.
In most cases, OBA has occurred only from the supplier to the buyer as it happens in the
automotive sector (Soares, 2011; Windolph and Moeller, 2012). In general, such situation
probably occurs because the buyer exerts more power over the supplier, like the supply
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chain collaboration found in a tyranny (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1999; Souza, 2008; Souza
and Rocha, 2009).
Satisfaction in the relationship between buyers and suppliers
According to Wipple et al. (2010), the collaborative relationships provide greater beneﬁt
when compared to relationships transaction-oriented only, as such beneﬁts include
performance improvement along with general satisfaction regarding the relation and its
results. Voldnes et al. (2012) highlight that the success of a partnership relationship depends
on the parties’ satisfaction, which is related to the quality of collaboration, economic and
ﬁnancial gains (Windolph andMoeller, 2012).
Satisfaction is a key factor on relationships management (Voldnes et al., 2012) and
“composes a vital importance construct to explain any type of relation between two or more
participants” (Sanzo et al., 2003, p. 329, translated). Field and Meile (2008) observed that
strong relationships with suppliers have been associated with higher satisfaction and
performance. Satisfaction appears as a pre-requirement to develop and maintain long-
lasting relationships and it can be divided into two types: focus specially on the economic
aspects of the relationship and focus on non-economic aspects, the terms of which have been
proposed by Geyskens et al. (1999).
Geyskens et al. (1999) state that economic satisfaction is a positive affective response
from the members of the channel to the economic rewards that ﬂow from the relation with
the partner such as increase in sales volume and markup. On the other hand, non-economic
(Geyskens et al., 1999) or social (Geyskens and Steenkamp, 2000) satisfaction refers to
positive affective response from a member of the channel with the psychosocial aspects of
the relation in which interactions with the exchange partners are met, gratifying and easy.
Therefore, such dimension is based on subjective aspects such as social contact,
communication or shared values (Dekker, 2004; Rodríguez et al., 2006).
Nyaga et al. (2010) evaluate satisfaction through two different constructs, following
Geyskens et al. (1999): economic and non-economic satisfaction. However, they suggest other
nomenclatures: satisfaction with the relationship such as participation in decision-making,
commitment, information sharing, coordination and activities management, that is, non-
economic satisfaction; conversely, the economic satisfaction refers to the results focused on
performance features such as proﬁtability, market share and sales increase.
The present study adopts the assessment of satisfaction with the relationship from
suppliers and buyers, according to both dimensions proposed by Geyskens et al. (1999),
Nyaga et al. (2010) andWindolph andMoeller (2012):
 economic satisfaction, concerning the assessment, by the parties, of economic,
ﬁnancial and asset results of the relationship such as market share, sales growth
and markup; and
 social satisfaction, concerning the assessment by the parties of psychosocial aspects
such as participation on decision making, commitment with the objectives,
information sharing, including the quality of information shared (Kulmala et al.,
2002), coordination, management of processes and activities, and quality of the
collaboration.
Satisfaction and open-book accounting
Information sharing among companies from a value chain is, at ﬁrst, an important factor to
develop successful relationships leading to parties’ satisfaction and creating competitive
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advantage in relation to competing value chains. But, if on one hand, according to TCE
principles, information sharing increases the efﬁciency of transactions and reduces costs, on
the other hand, opportunistic behavior may be enhanced when they are unilaterally applied,
raising transaction risks and costs because of the increase of monitoring costs.
Therefore, unilateral sharing of cost information (considering that, as a general rule, only
suppliers make information available) may increase suppliers’ vulnerabilities regarding
potential opportunism from buyers. This, in turn, signiﬁcantly inﬂuences not only suppliers’
perception in relation to OBA beneﬁts but also their satisfaction with the relationship
(Windolph and Moeller, 2012). So, OBA may inﬂuence, both positively and negatively, on
economic and social satisfaction with the relationship.
However, Windolph and Moeller (2012) highlight that safeguards against possible
opportunistic behavior are especially relevant to analyze suppliers’ satisfaction with OBA,
as they attenuate opportunism risk by assuring buyers that their data will be used in a
constructive way.
Under these circumstances, although the link between OBA and satisfaction may
seem unlikely in most of the cases – especially in the automotive industry – this is not
true for 100 per cent of chains and not even for 100 per cent of companies in the
automotive sector. It is not always that automotive industries force their suppliers to
unilaterally provide information, as it depends on the strength relation. In the current
research, the auto manufacturer under study is weaker than some of its suppliers (tires,
for instance); consequently, it cannot force them to provide information and has to accept
low level of information details (which are made available bracketed into different types
of tire).
Concerning this phenomenon, Souza and Rocha (2009) – although without clearly
mentioning the automotive sector – note that the type of chain (tyranny, oligarchy and
democracy) in which the company is inserted allows to verify higher or lower probability of
IOCM application and, consequently, OBA. Practicing both processes is more feasible in
tyrant or oligarchic chains, because of their main characteristics. In these types of chains,
the tyrant or oligarchic company may address such processes. Therefore, the more the
company presents characteristics similar to the chain of tyranny, the more likely and viable
will be the application of the IOCM and the OBA.
Still, it is also necessary that there is an enabling relationship including interdependence,
stability, cooperation and trust aspects. So, in face of relationship taxology (common,
auxiliary, main and familiar), the closer a relationship is, most probable and feasible to
IOCM and OBA practice, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1.
Analysis matrix for
IOCM/OBA
application:
relationship level and
type of chain
Tyrant Oligarchic Democrat
Type of chain
Familiar  
Main  
Auxiliary R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p Recommendation for IOCM/OBA
     Very likely 
     Likely 
     Possible 
     Remote Common  
Source: Adapted from Souza and Rocha (2009, p. 114)
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It is observed that when the base of a relationship is not trust, as it happens in most part of
the cases, that part of the chain does not have any competitive advantage in relation to other
chains in which relationships present this aspect as a base. In this context, contemporary
artifacts of strategic cost management, IOCM and OBA become important, as companies
that apply them tend to get and keep competitive advantage comparing to those companies
that do not do the same.
Even to test falseability of the belief that information sharing between supplier and client
in the automotive sector is unlikely or impossible, this study has focused on a sector in
which, generally, strengths are unbalanced. That is because if a supply chain with more
balanced power relation had been chosen, results would be trivial and predictable.
Considering the importance of trust on closer relationships and its inﬂuence on
satisfaction, their characteristics – considering TCE context – are presented in the next
section.
Trust in the context of transaction costs economics
Although TCE does not approach in a systematic way the trust in relations, Oliver
Williamson has shown interest in the issue, as in his work of 1996, on which he dedicated a
chapter to it, named “Calculativeness, Trust and Organization Theory”, to discuss trust and
calculativeness in relationships. Williamson (1996) states that TCE refers to contract
mechanisms as a consequence of the risk of opportunistic behavior, or its absence, instead of
trust, or its absence.
The author argues that it may be a mistake to use the entry “trust” to describe the
commercial exchange for which low cost safeguard has been created as a support for the
most efﬁcient changes. Thus, for TCE perspective “trust is understood as a vague and
useful entry for economic exchange” (Ladeira et al., 2009, p. 53).
The context of TCE in which trust appears, as considered by Ladeira et al. (2009), is the
one concerning governance structures, in which transactions are made and the agents’
opportunistic behavior arise. Thus, trust would be associated with opportunism as the
economic agents are guided by not only their individual interests but also the self-interest
with avidity (opportunistic behavior).
Williamson (1996) ensures that there is no pure trust. The transactions have some kind of
safeguard, whether it is contractual, legal, reputational or institutional that protects the
transaction; hence, there is no transaction without safeguard. In practice, in the view of the
author, there is a calculative trust which has an impact on the decision of cooperating or not.
Therefore, it does not concern spontaneous cooperation: companies would act in a way of
protecting the value of their information to the possible extent.
Previous studies
The main purpose of the OBA is to enhance the efﬁciency of the interorganizational costs
management, revealing the potential of costs economy of joint activities between buyers and
suppliers (Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005; Kulmala et al., 2002). Few research studies have
risked to investigate the extent of OBA’s implementation inﬂuence on the satisfaction of the
parties in a relationship (Windolph and Moeller, 2012). That is probably because OBA is a
recent practice, according to Kajüter and Kulmala (2005); it has arisen with the advance of
lean manufacturing by Japanese companies in the 90’s.
As per Table I, there is a lack of studies on the inﬂuence of OBA and trust on the
satisfaction of the parties concerning interorganizational relationship, considering if such
inﬂuence depends on other factors of the relation context. Only three studies have
considered satisfaction in the relationship (Kulmala et al., 2002; Nyaga et al., 2010; Windolph
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and Moeller, 2012). Table I shows the objectives, results and gaps presented on the above-
mentioned studies.
Although in the automotive sector both auto manufacturers and their suppliers are
usually global (Kulmala et al., 2007), it is important to investigate satisfaction in the
relationship with OBA of such players settled in Brazil, considering that cultural differences
inﬂuence precedents of satisfaction such as trust, communication/information sharing,
dependence and commitment (Voldnes et al., 2012).
Research path
Data gathering
The automotive sector supply chain has been studied for the present research since it is one
of the most relevant for the industry sectors, as it is considered an important employment
and income source. According to Pires (1998), Marini (2003), Guarnieri et al. (2009), Pires and
Sacomano Neto (2010) and Abinajm Filho (2011), this sector is pioneer in several managerial
concepts, techniques and technological innovation, which are used by companies from
different sectors, highlighting its importance to the development of companies in general.
One auto manufacturer and three direct suppliers were analyzed as the study aimed at
conducting an investigation on a dyadic relation. The choice of companies was intentional
(non-probability sampling). Although the auto manufacturer is not among the biggest ones
of the sector in Brazil, this company has important representativeness, even because of its
brand.
Table I.
Studies on OBA and
satisfaction: main
results and gaps
Author(s)/
Year Objectives Main results Gaps
Kulmala
et al. (2002)
To verify the types of
challenges presented by
networking for costs
management
It has been observed that most
of the suppliers do not share
their data because ofbecause
of their poor costs accounting
Aspects of OBA’s relation
context, which may affect the
satisfaction of the parties in
the relationship have not been
considered; also, IOCM has not
been contemplated
Nyaga et al.
(2010)
To exam the precedents of
performance and
satisfaction on a dyadic
perspective and, still, to
investigate similarities
and differences on buyers’
and suppliers’ perception
regarding such precedents
and the results of the
collaboration relations
It has been observed that
collaborative activities lead to
trust and commitment, which
in turn improve satisfaction
and performance; buyers focus
on results and suppliers focus
on safeguarding their speciﬁc
assets
The IOCM analysis has not
considered the inﬂuence
of speciﬁc assets invested, of
opportunistic behavior and of
safeguards
Windolph
and Moeller
(2012)
To verify the extension
through which OBA
(unilateral) inﬂuences on
satisfaction on the
relationship, while
responsible for IOCM’s
inﬂuence
The ﬁndings have shown that
unilateral sharing of
information may negatively
inﬂuence on supplier’s
satisfaction with the
relationship; and the social
standards of the relationship
signiﬁcantly understates the
negative effect of OBA on the
satisfaction
The investigation occurred
only on the suppliers’
perspective and trust and
speciﬁc assets analysis have
not been considered
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The suppliers have been referred to by the auto manufacturer, meeting the demand of
being ﬁrst tier and different proﬁles. So, one of the suppliers is one of the world’s leading tire
manufacturers, with exclusive supply to the auto manufacturer, the other supplier is the
world’s leading wheel manufacturer and the third supplier is a subsidiary of an Asian group
which manufactures harness, however such division has facilities only in Brazil.
Data gathering has been conducted through document survey and semi-structured and
in-depth interviews. Yet, as the research has been conducted on a dyadic perspective, it was
possible to crosscheck and compare (cross-comparison) various data obtained through
interviews in both the auto manufacturer and suppliers, which has contributed to enhance
data reliability.
A data collection instrument has been developed for the interviews based on subjects
that compose the study objective, and questions were separated in sets by type of subject.
The instrument underwent a pretest to verify its applicability and need of adjustments,
which was done with broad experienced professional in the automotive sector who has
worked for many years as an auto manufacturer executive, besides being a professor and
scholar in the ﬁeld of interorganizational relationships. Some points that needed adjustment
have been identiﬁed, those were discussed and then applicable changes were done.
The objective of document survey was to get information about the companies.
Information has been collected from public sources such as magazines from the automotive
sector and companies’ ofﬁcial websites. Internal documents from the companies have also
been reviewed such as cost sheets, supply contracts, suppliers performance index (SPI)
sheet, which evaluates the suppliers’ performance regarding supply to the auto
manufacturer, and purchase ledger, monthly report issued by the auto manufacturer
showing its performance, indexes follow-up, as well as data of the suppliers such as their
position concerning billing, monthly purchase volume by supplier, adjustment of costs
granted in the period, among others.
The relationship of the Brazilian auto manufacturer Alfa with its suppliers is carried out
by the purchasing manager, a member of the supply department, who is responsible to
contact the supplier‘s sales manager. The semi-structured and in-depth interviews have
been conducted with the purchasing manager of the auto manufacturer and sales managers
of suppliers.
The interviews occurred between September 2014 and June 2015, in the respective
companies, except for the interview with the accounts manager of Gama Supplier, which
took place at Alfa Auto Manufacturer; all interviews have been recorded under
authorization of the respondent and further transcribed. Three visits have been made to Alfa
plant for interviews and document review, and the visits lasted two hours or more.
Table II presents information about the respondents, duration of the interview and time
for document analysis.
The data gathering instrument has been submitted to a pretest, to verify its applicability
and need of adjustment. Whenever possible, previously tested and approved questions from
previous studies have been used to reduce response errors (Van der Stede et al., 2005, 2007).
Two different scripts for interview have been prepared according to the position of the
relationship as it was a dyadic study.
Data processing
As this is a qualitative study, the content analysis, a category technique (Bardin, 2011), has
been used to analyze the interviews.
The category technique is the eldest and most used one. It is also named thematic
analysis; such technique concerns the analysis of the meanings to interpreter
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communications. It consists of partitioning the text into units represented by the categories,
which allows the encoding units’ classiﬁcation into categories of elements of signiﬁcation.
Functionality of the analysis categories. According to Zylbersztajn (1995), the behavioral
assumption of TCE – limited rationale and opportunistic behavior – allows to analyze the
dynamic characteristics of the contracts, tradition aspects, trust, family relations and social
environments that restrain opportunistic actions. In the case of trust, it is expected that
buyers and suppliers that trust each other will be more satisﬁed with the relationship and
will make an effort to ensure its continuity (Nyaga et al., 2010).
It is also expected that mutual trust enhances OBA, as it tends to reduce the chance of
inappropriate use of information (Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005). Thus, trust would have the
potential to repress opportunistic behaviors and so minimize transaction costs in
interorganizational relationships (Dyer, 1997; Dyer and Chu, 2000, 2003; Claro et al., 2005;
Claro and Claro, 2008).
Aiming to verify how OBA and trust inﬂuence the satisfaction of the parties with the
relationship, the categorization and analysis were supported by TCE. To facilitate the
analysis of the interviews and achieve the general objective of this study, the identiﬁcation
of categories and subcategories of the variables investigated are presented in Table III.
Therefore, the categorization of the passages of the interviews has been done according
to the variables described in Table III.
The software QDA Miner (test version) has been used for the categorization process, the
function of which is to encode, take notes and analyze documents as well as images.
Development, analysis, interpretation and discussion of the results
Description of the companies
Table IV presents the main features of the companies studied. To keep information about
the auto manufacturer and supplier conﬁdential, some information has been omitted and
their names have been changed, using the names Alfa Auto Manufacturer, Beta Supplier,
Gama Supplier and Delta Supplier.
In the next topic, the characterization of the relationships is presented.
Table II.
Data of the
interviews
Position in the
relationship Respondent Position
Time in
position
(years)
Time in the
sector*
(years)
Duration of interviews** Time for
document
review**Originals Complementary
Alfa Auto
Manufacturer
Alfa
respondent
Purchasing
Manager
4 27 66:01 48:42 252:24
Beta
supplier
Beta
respondent
Sales Manager 1 1 54:13 16:39
Gama Supplier Gama
respondent
Account
Manager for
Auto
Manufacturers
7 18 124:53 –
Delta
supplier
Delta
respondent
Commercial
Manager
1 14 44:45 61:39
Totals 289:52 127:00 252:24
416:52
Notes: *Approximately **Minutes: Complementary interviews have been made by phone, except for the
purchasing manager of the auto manufacturer, which was conducted in the auto manufacturing plant; The
supply contracts with the three suppliers have all been analyzed in the auto manufacturing plant
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Characterization of the relationships
Alfa Auto Manufacturer has around 300 suppliers, and about 150 of them are called
productive, that is, directly connected to the production. The company classiﬁes it suppliers
using ABC curve in relation to the monthly purchases: the auto manufacturer sums, for each
supplier, all bills of the products delivered and thus the result is howmuch each supplier has
billed for the company in the month. Suppliers classiﬁed as “A” are those with higher billing
Table III.
Categorization of the
variables
investigated
Investigated variables
(Main authors) Categories Details
OBA Fehr (2015) Dimensions of
OBA
Nature of information
Type of information
Frequency of information sharing
Level of detail of the information
Direction of information sharing
Purpose of use of the information (by the buyer)
Purpose of use of the information (by the supplier)
Processes contemplated
Means of communication
Costs determinants contemplated
Conditions of information sharing
Incentives for sharing information
IOCM
Cooper and Slagmulder
(1999, 2004) Windolph
and Moeller (2012)
Development of
joint activities
Interorganizational teams
Joint processes for costs management
Joint planning for problem solving
Trust
Kumar et al. (1995a,
1995b), Nyaga et al. (2010)
Honesty Promises’ fulﬁllment
Generosity Availability to offer assistance and support
Protection of the other party’s interest
Satisfaction in the
relationship
Geyskens et al. (1999),
Kulmala et al. (2002),
Nyaga et al. (2010),
Windolph and Moeller
(2012)
Economic
satisfaction
Sales and proﬁts created by the relationship
Market share resulting from the relationship
Social
Satisfaction
Quality of the information shared
Quality of collaboration
Participation on decision-making related to the
relationship
Assets speciﬁcity
Williamson (1985, 1996),
Zylbersztajn (1995),
Bánkut and Souza (2014)
Level of
redistribution of
an asset for
alternative use
Investment on speciﬁc assets
Assets reallocation/redistribution
Lost of value on investments under breach of
contract
Safeguards
Williamson (1996), Jap
and Ganesan (2000)
Windolph and Moeller
(2012)
Formal or
informal rules
and standards
Formal safeguards
Informal safeguards
Flexibility to provide support to each other
Set mutual beneﬁts
Opportunistic behavior
Williamson (1985, 1996),
Windolph and Moeller
(2012)
Self-interest
(with avidity)
Inappropriate use of information shared
Breach of agreements (formal and informal) in self-
beneﬁt
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for the auto manufacturer, which may vary from 12 to 18, depending on howmuch each one
billed in the month. “B” represent the intermediate suppliers and “C” are those with low
billing.
Suppliers’ development is another classiﬁcation used. Its assessment is based on quality,
logistic development, delivery punctuality, etc. by means of indicator SPI. Such
classiﬁcation presents four possibilities:
(1) “red”, represents the most problematic suppliers;
(2) “yellow”, those in an acceptable range;
(3) “green 1”, good suppliers; and
(4) “green 2”, which is the range of suppliers that do not present any problems,
therefore, the best classiﬁcation.
Table V presents the features of the relationships studied.
The analysis of results and conclusions are presented in the next sections.
General analysis of the cases
Table VI, in the sequence, presents the main results of the research. OBA is applied
unilaterally, forced by the auto manufacturer, forming a selective process of information as
suppliers try to protect their information against opportunist behavior exhibited by the auto
manufacturer. The detail level of the information shared (related to the type and nature of
the information and its aggregation or not) is one of the ways suppliers use to protect
themselves. Beta Supplier is the one that presents higher detail level and Delta is the one
that most restricts its information.
The detail level of the information shared related to the probability of having the
adjustment required granted is a phenomenon found in the cases analyzed, and for which no
reference in literature has been found. The higher the transparency on information shared
Table IV.
Description of the
companies studied
Companies
Alfa Auto
Manufacturer Beta Supplier Gama Supplier Delta Supplier
Branch of
activity
Manufacturer of
passenger car and
light commercial
vehicle
Manufacturer of
electric and electronic
components (plates
and harnesses), and
panel mounting for
the automotive
industry
Manufacturer of
aluminum and steel
wheels for the
automotive industry
Manufacturer of tires
for the automotive
industry
Legal structure Limited Company Limited Company Joint Stock Company Limited Company
Capital origin Brazilian capital, but
uses the trademark of
a huge Asian auto
manufacturer
Asian capital Brazilian capital Italian capital
Billing (2014)
(US$ quotation
from 5/17/2017)
Around R$4,500m
(research data)
(approximately US
$1,448m)
Around R$260m
(research data)
(approximately US
$84m )
R$5,911.67m
(BM&FBOVESPA,
2015)
(approximately US
$1,902m)
e6,018m (research
data)
(approximately US
$6,700m)
Number of
employees
2,500 direct
employees
2,600 direct
employees
18,500 direct
employees
38,000 direct
employees
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by the supplier, higher the probability of the auto manufacturer to grant an adjustment close
to the required. Conversely, the lowest the detail level of information, the lower the
probability of having granted an adjustment near the required.
Gama and Delta Suppliers share their information in a limited way. Maybe because it is a
requirement from the automotive sector, even Alfa Auto Manufacturer having a little
market share compared to bigger auto manufacturers, Gama and Delta may not see
alternative for not sharing information. Second point, the medium or low detail level that
they exhibit may be explained by different factors: risk of opportunism from the auto
manufacturer, absence of economic dependency from the auto manufacturer (such suppliers’
size are larger than the auto manufacturer), relationship with all big auto manufacturer in
Brazil and worldwide, type of product provided, etc. Third point, as highlighted by Alfa
respondent, it may be more difﬁcult and onerous for the auto manufacturer to change the
supplier and develop a new one, even considering the speciﬁc assets invested than accepting
the detail levels below expectations.
Table V.
Characterization of
the relationships
studied
Characteristics of
the relationships
Beta Supplier and Alfa
Auto Manufacturer
Gama Supplier and Alfa
Auto Manufacturer
Delta Supplier and Alfa
Auto Manufacturer
Time of
relationship
Around 5 years Around 8 years Around 15 years
Exclusivity on
supply
Not exclusive (divides
supply with other two
suppliers)
Not exclusive (divides
supply with other two
suppliers)
Exclusive
ABC curve
classiﬁcation
Level A Level A Level A
SPI classiﬁcation Yellow Green 2 Yellow
Product supplied Electric harness: does not
present high added value
neither restricted
technology, low
speciﬁcity with several
suppliers alternative and
limited importance for the
auto manufacturer.
Initially, such supplier
would not be difﬁcult to
replace
Aluminum and steel wheel:
although, at ﬁrst, there is
no technological
restriction, the product
presents high added
value, certain speciﬁcity,
and it is critical for the
auto manufacturer,
despite there are other
suppliers options
Tires: present high
technology (therefore,
technological restriction),
high added value, certain
speciﬁcity and it is critical
for the auto manufacturer
with few options of
suppliers. Exclusive
supplier for Alfa Auto
Manufacturer
Economic
dependence
Signiﬁcant part of its
gross revenue (around
20%) comes from the
relationship with Alfa
Auto Manufacturer. Also,
the type of product
supplied and the need of
relationship with an auto
manufacturer may
evidence certain
dependence of Beta
Supplier related to Alfa
Auto Manufacturer
Economic dependence has
not been observed, as only
1% of the supplier’s gross
revenue comes from the
relationship with the Auto
Manufacturer, besides the
supplier’s size is bigger
than the auto
manufacturer, and its
supply for all important
auto manufacturers in
Brazil and other countries
Economic dependence has
not been observed, as only
1.5% of the supplier’s
gross revenue comes from
the relationship with the
auto manufacturer. The
supplier is a big
multinational company
with clients worldwide
and, still, by the
importance of its support
on a marketing event
(Motorsport) of the auto
manufacturer it is difﬁcult
to replace this supplier
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Kajüter and Kulmala (2005) state that impose OBA may only be applied in direct dyadic
relationships in which there is economic dependence. Gama and Delta Suppliers do not
economically depend on Alfa Auto Manufacturer; however, they share information, even if
in a limited way. Such ﬁnding contradicts Kajüter and Kulmala (2005) and evidences that
there are other factors that may interfere on the relationship and contributes for OBA
application, albeit in a forcedway.
The literature about OBA (Seal et al., 1999; Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005; Aguiar et al.,
2008) recommends that, to ensure expectations related to OBA, technical and social
requirements must be accomplished, including relationships must be characterized by
interrelated exchanges (Macneil, 1978; Ganesan, 1994; Choi and Wu, 2009; Agndal and
Nilsson, 2010; Villena et al., 2011). However, in the cases researched, not all requirements
have been found. Although the respondents have reinforced the existence of partnership,
evidences appoint to controversial relationships, based on pressure to reduce prices and
with occasional joint strategies. The cooperation is not fully spontaneous and trust is partial,
both certainly motivated by some kind of beneﬁt (Ganesan, 1994; Williamson, 1996;
Balestrin and Verschoore, 2014). Still, suppliers try to protect the value of their information
in different ways against the risk of opportunism from the auto manufacturer (through
contract, interrelated and reputation safeguards and sharing information restrictively).
Although the relationships researched are long-term (Beta – 5 years; Gama – 8 years; and
Delta – 15 years, approximately), the aspects highlighted on the previous paragraph show
that OBA occurs in an environment that also presents features of the strategies of
transactional purchases introduced by Agndal and Nilsson (2010). In such situation,
information sharing is used mainly for suppliers selection and assessment, more related
with their monitoring than with support on planning and coordination of the joint actions
(Tomkins, 2001; Agndal and Nilsson, 2010). The ﬁnding of the present research shows that
OBA is used mostly to negotiate with suppliers (in the case of selection and, mainly, price
adjustment) and identiﬁcation of opportunities of costs reduction to reduce prices from the
suppliers, possibly generating more beneﬁts to the auto manufacturer.
Albeit suppliers declared high satisfaction with OBA, contradictorily it has been
observed that none of them share their information spontaneously. Furthermore, all of them
try to limit information shared. This may evidence that suppliers see few advantages on
OBA application. Also, it has been observed that the auto manufacturer satisfaction with
information sharing is high and related with the detail level of the information shared. The
more transparent the information, the higher the auto manufacturer satisfaction with OBA
and with the economic–ﬁnancial results (economic satisfaction) arising from the
relationships, since its economic earnings may be increased by the identiﬁcation of costs
reduction opportunities. Although it seems obvious, no reference on literature about such
ﬁnding has been found.
Both the auto manufacturer and the suppliers highlighted high social satisfaction with
the relationship. Although both parties have informed the existence of partnership,
collaboration, mutual trust and mutual beneﬁts, evidence shows no partnership, little
collaboration, partial trust and more beneﬁts generation to the auto manufacturer than to
the suppliers. However, it still seems that there is a certain understanding between the
parties which make them notice a “good relationship,” even though they are long-term
relationships. Suppliers also commented that, although the auto manufacturer pressures
their prices, it allows negotiation and considers that the suppliers also need beneﬁts. They
also said that the relationship with Alfa Auto Manufacturer, which is a small size company,
presents better quality than the relationship with big auto manufacturers or other big
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clients. That is, comparing with the mentioned relationships, the relationships with Alfa
Auto Manufacturer may be less controversial.
It has been veriﬁed that OBAmay have both positive and negative effects over economic
and social satisfaction of suppliers, depending on how information is used by the auto
manufacturer. If, on one hand, the use is constructive, also beneﬁting the suppliers, then
OBA generates a positive effect on economic and social satisfaction. On the other hand, if
information is used inappropriately, with no beneﬁts to suppliers, then OBA affects
negatively their economic and social satisfaction, which is associated with risk of the auto
manufacturer’s opportunistic behavior, as TCE predicts.
Because of the use of shared information and the risk of auto manufacturer’s
opportunistic behavior, OBA may destroy trust (Kulmala, 2004) if information is
inappropriately used, or it may create trust in case of constructive use. (Morgan and Hunt,
1994; Seal et al., 1999; Tomkins, 2001; Dekker, 2003; Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005; Nyaga et al.,
2010).
Although the kind of trust found is partial (calculative trust), it has been observed that it
represents positive inﬂuence over economic and social satisfaction with the relationship,
both for the auto manufacturer and the suppliers. Trust is an important interrelated
mechanism of governance (Macneil, 1978) with potential to repress opportunistic behaviors
(Liu et al., 2009; Claro et al., 2005; Claro and Claro, 2008), reducing transaction costs (Dyer,
1997; Dyer and Chu, 2000, 2003; Claro et al., 2005; Claro and Claro, 2008), mainly the
negotiation and monitoring ones (Andrade et al., 2011). As a consequence, trust increases
suppliers’ economic earnings (economic satisfaction) and improves the quality of the
relationship (social satisfaction).
Although Dyer and Chu (2003) state that the bigger the asset’s speciﬁcity, the bigger the
probability of increasing information sharing by the need of coordinating idiosyncratic
exchanges, such situation has not been observed in the cases analyzed. It has been observed
that, in the presence of speciﬁc assets, the party with more power, in this case the auto
manufacturer may require more details regarding the information shared by the supplier,
which is contingent on the relationship with it, as in the case of Beta Supplier. In other
words, the increase of the detail level is related to the supplier dependence and to the power
practiced by the auto manufacturer (power-dependence) (Kumar et al., 1995b; Voldnes et al.,
2012) and not to the need of coordinating narrower relationships.
For Alfa Auto Manufacturer, the “open” relationship because of OBA application makes
it easier to invest on speciﬁc assets as the parties can discuss about such investment. Such
ﬁnding has also not been found in the literature researched and may reveal a way of
pressure used by the auto manufacturer so that the supplier shares or gives more details
about its information. In general, it has been observed that the investment on speciﬁc assets
positively inﬂuence on mutual trust (as demonstrates commitment and tendency for the
relationship continuity) and, consequently, economic and social satisfaction. It has not been
possible to conclude that the inﬂuence of OBA on economic and social satisfaction is related
to the speciﬁc assets invested in such relationships.
Regarding the safeguards found in the relationships studied, the contract safeguards
(supply and conﬁdentiality contract) have been reported by both parties as the most
important against opportunistic behavior. Such results are corroborated by Liu et al. (2009),
who afﬁrm that contract safeguards are more effective to mitigate opportunism. However,
the standard supply contract protects more Alfa Auto Manufacturer than the suppliers.
Interrelated safeguards found in the cases studied seem to be not so effective, as they do not
occur in a broad and forceful way. Although safeguards are adopted in all cases and they
have the power to reduce the risk of opportunism, increasing trust and economic and social
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satisfaction, possibly unilateral OBA, exerts more negative than positive inﬂuence over both
economic (such as the increase of monitoring costs and reduction of economic earnings) and
social (such as reduction of trust and quality of the relationship) satisfaction of suppliers.
According toWilliamson (1996), one of the purposes of the safeguards is to create mutual
trust. However, it is possible that the reputational safeguards used by Alfa Auto
Manufacturer and the standard supply contract (contract safeguard) tend to negatively
affect trust and, as a consequence, economic and social satisfaction of suppliers. This may
stem from the fact that the reputational safeguards adopted by the auto manufacturer are
related to the imposed application of OBA, the pressure to increase the detail level of
information subject to the penalty of not having granted the adjustments near to the
required or not getting new businesses. The standard supply contract protects more the auto
manufacturer than the suppliers.
Finally, the results found are aligned with TCE, which states that the information
asymmetry affects negatively the transaction and is related to the opportunistic behavior of
the parties, the uncertainties related to the transaction, the complexity of the contracts and
the agents’ limited rationality (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Zylbersztajn, 1995; Bánkut and
Souza, 2014). Thus, the unilateral information sharing exposes the suppliers to the risk of
the auto manufacturer’s opportunistic behavior, creating uncertainties regarding the
relationship. Such aspects are aggravated by the limited rationality, which makes it
impossible for the parties to anticipate possible situations in contracts, which are complex.
As a result, such issues damage OBA’s performance.
The opportunism of buyers tends to reduce the positive or to increase the negative effect
of OBA over economic and social satisfaction of the suppliers, while such behavior reduces
the economic beneﬁts resulting from the costs information sharing. Windolph and Moeller
(2012) observe that suppliers may accept the risk of buyers’ opportunistic behavior or to
implement additional safeguards; both situations tend to reduce the economic earnings of
the suppliers. The abusive use of information shared by the buyers negatively affects the
relation between OBA and the economic and social satisfaction of the suppliers, especially
when OBA is imposed by the buyers (Kajüter and Kulmala, 2005), and not in trust and
partnership (Carr and Ng, 1995; Seal et al., 1999).
Conclusions
Even if suppliers may have beneﬁts, such as inefﬁciencies identiﬁcation, OBA usage is not
started aiming at costs management in the supply chain, but in a way that the auto
manufacturer may claim for prices reduction. Such aspects negatively inﬂuence their
perception in relation to the tool because of the risk of opportunistic behavior and by the
absence of the win–win principle (mutual beneﬁts), curtailing the suppliers’ willingness to
share information. Unilateral OBA is not a well-accepted tool by suppliers due to the
purposes of using of the information shared in the researched relationships, which limit the
scope of beneﬁts creation. If suppliers identify opportunity for costs reduction, then they will
not have incentive to share such information with the auto manufacturer. It has been
concluded that OBA is not necessarily an IOCM tool as most of literature claims, for OBA is
not aligned with it.
The longevity of the relationships is not necessarily a result of information sharing.
Unilateral OBA tends to affect satisfaction most negative than positively, hence negatively
affecting the relationship continuity. OBA may be applied by imposition in dyadic
relationships, where there is no supplier’s economic dependence on auto manufacturer,
contradicting Kajüter and Kulmala (2005). This implies that there are other aspects of the
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interrelated context that may inﬂuence OBA’s application. The conclusion is that part of the
literature does not ﬁnd support in the reality of the cases studied.
Trust, which is recognized as an important aspect for sharing information has also
not been identiﬁed. In the relationships analyzed, trust is partial, not a requirement for
OBA application and not always favors the increase of detail level of the shared
information, being not aligned with most part of the literature concerning OBA. The
implication of that is that the lack of suppliers’ trust and the risk of auto manufacturer’s
opportunistic behavior limit the application of such tool, restricting the beneﬁts it could
create.
It has been veriﬁed that, mainly for suppliers, few beneﬁts are created with information
sharing. OBA does lend itself to an easy use and it is not well accepted by suppliers. This
entails the need for more empirical research about the subject to identify the reasons for
such gap and to align actual data (company’s reality) with theoretical literature. There is a
gap between literature and the reality of the companies studied.
OBA by itself does not ensure an increase in trust level, as foreseen by TCE, which deals
with calculative trust (Williamson, 1996) because of the opportunistic behavior that the
parties may exhibit. However, trust is important to raise economic and social satisfaction,
and, consequently, continuity of the relationships. Such construct has been analyzed based
on the literature researched, but according to Tomkins (2001), there is a lack of a robust
theory about the interaction between trust and information sharing.
Although literature highlights the advantages of OBA and recognizes that its application
certainly creates beneﬁts for all the parties involved, as afﬁrmed by Kajüter and Kulmala
(2005), the ensuing conclusions were drawn in the light of the cases studied:
 in practice such tool has little usefulness;
 is garbled from its main purpose—manage costs in the supply chain; and
 does not necessarily create beneﬁts for all the companies involved in this process.
The number of interviews is a limitation of this work, as they were in-depth, however in
four companies only. Therefore, results found do not allow generalization, but were
enough for the intended analysis. Additionally, the research was conducted in a one-on-
one perspective allowing to face and compare (cross-comparison) a number of
information obtained through interviews conducted both at the auto manufacturer and
suppliers.
As a suggestion for futures studies, this research could be conducted with two or more
auto manufacturers, of different sizes, and some common direct suppliers with a view to
verify if different results emerge. Another suggestion would be to include in the
investigation a key direct supplier of the auto manufacturer that has not adopted OBA and
verify the reasons involved for not sharing information, or still, include a supplier that has
applied OBA during a period and stopped to apply it.
Another interesting aspect to study would be the inclusion of other background
information of satisfaction in the analysis, such as power-dependence and engagement.
Although these two constructs have been considered in the research, the emphasis was
on information sharing and trust. It is also suggested to conduct this research through a
survey with all auto manufacturers in Brazil and their direct suppliers with a view to
generalize ﬁndings and for a more effective measurement of relationship satisfaction
and trust. Finally, investigation could be conducted in other economic sectors, in which
the companies apply OBA. The objective would be to compare with the present
research, as the automotive sector has speciﬁc features that inﬂuence OBA.
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